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1981] RECENT CASES 255
Although this portion of the Worthey decision may have only slight
practical effect, the court must be commended for its recognition that the
existence of a defect is not an issue in a breach of warranty case.28 This
position is consistent with the warranty sections of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. 29 Nowhere does the Code suggest that proof of a specific defect
should be required. Only a few courts have even considered such a require-
ment. The Worthey decision should help to erase all semblance of the re-
quirement from Missouri warranty law.
MARTIN M. LORING
THE STATE OF THE LAW AS
EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY
United States v. Garber'
Dorothy Garber was indicted under the income tax evasion statute2 for
willfully and knowingly attempting to evade income taxes for three sepa-
rate years. Ms. Garber was convicted by a jury for failing to report income
for one of those years. The money in question was from payments the tax-
28. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section,
adopted by Missouri in Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.
1969), imposes strict liability in tort on "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or his property." A
plaintiff under § 402A may prove the existence of a defect by inference from cir-
cumstantial evidence. Winters v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 554 S.W.2d 565 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1977) (relying on Williams). Winters further held that "common ex-
perience tells us that some accidents do not ordinarily occur in the absence of a
defect and in those situations the inference that a product is defective is permissi-
ble." Id. at 570. This appears to be similar to the tort concept of res ipsa loquitur.
It differs little fromJacobson's requirement of a "defect."
29. U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to -318.
1. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
2. I.R.C. § 7201 provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon convic-
tion thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
1
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payer had received for her blood plasma, which contained an extremely
rare antibody used in the production of a blood-group-typing serum. Ms.
Garber did not report the bulk of the payments received, although she did
report a $200.00 per week salary she received in connection with her ser-
vices to the purchasing labs.3
At trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida the defense took the position that the payments were not taxable,
and, alternatively, if they were taxable that Ms. Garber had not willfully
attempted to evade taxes, and thus was not criminally liable for failure to
report the income. 4 The defense produced as an expert witness, a certified
public accountant and former revenue agent, who testified in camera to
his conclusion that the payments were not taxable. The federal district
court refused, however, to allow the witness or the government's counter
expert witness to testify before the jury, finding that the issue of taxability
was a matter of law for the court to decide. The defense argued that the ex-
pert's testimony would be relevant to illustrate to the jury that the taxabil-
ity of the payments was an undecided issue, which in turn would be rele-
vant to the element of willfulness. The trial court rejected this contention
because it found that Ms. Garber had in fact not relied on (or even been
aware of) the view expressed by the expert witness in preparing her tax
returns. 5 The court distinguished cases where the taxpayer relied in good
faith on the advice of a third party in preparing his return. 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The appellate court held
that it was error for the trial judge to have excluded the testimony of the
defendant's expert witness as to the taxability of the payments received. 7
The court reasoned that the testimony would have been relevant to the
issue of willfulness, because in situations where the nature of the obligation
imposed by law is unresolved, it is more likely that a defendant is unaware
of or is mistaken about his legal obligation. 8
As a general rule courts have excluded testimony or other evidence
3. 607 F.2d at 94. Ms. Garber received at least $70,000 for the sale of her
plasma in each of the tax years in question.
4. See text accompanying notes 21-25 infra.
5. 607 F.2d at 96. Ms. Garber claimed to have based her opinion that the
payments were not taxable on discussions with friends and relatives, not on pro-
fessional advice.
6. See, e.g., Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 981 (5th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Bengimina, 499 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Dowell, 446 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
7. 607 F.2d at 97. The appellate court held that the exclusion of the testi-
mony coupled with the refusal to give the instructions requested by the defendant
warranted a reversal. This Casenote will discuss only the court's ruling on the ex-
pert testimony.
8. Id. at 98.
[Vol. 46
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pertaining to matters of law. 9 Instruction of the jury on the law is the pro-
vince of the court, and when a decision is required on an issue of law, the
decision is made by the judge - distinct from the jury as trier of fact. This
principal is so fundamental as to be axiomatic. 10 The trial judge in Garb er
considered the testimony of the two experts in camera before deciding as a
matter of law that the payments were taxable, 1 but did not allow the jury
to hear the testimony.1 2
The Garber court had no directly applicable precedent which would
allow an expert to testify on the state of the law,' 3 but based its decision on
the broad language of Federal Rules of Evidence 702.14 The court directed
that the testimony could be used on remand not to convince the jury that
the payments to the defendant were nontaxable, but rather to illustrate
that even qualified tax "experts" believed the payments were nontaxable.
This evidence could then be used by the jury to decide whether the state of
mind required -willfulness -was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5
While such a use of the expert testimony would not call upon a jury to
decide a question of law, it could create other problems.
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 provides a broadly stated standard for
9. Richard T. Green Co. v. City of Chelsea, 149 F.2d 927, 930 n.5 (1st Cir.)
(whether dock rigging real or personal property), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741
(1945); Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1974) (meaning of
tax statute), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975); Allen v. Union R.R., 162 F.
Supp. 635, 637 (W.D. Pa. 1958) (meaning of safety regulation); St. Louis v. Kis-
ling, 318 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Mo. 1958) (effect of regulation on utility easement);
Urban Renewal Agency v. Bethke, 420 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
(construction of zoning law). See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2549 (3d
ed. 1940).
10. See 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2549.
11. 607 F.2d at 96.
12. Id.
13. One area in which there is a history of the use of expert testimony on the
law is where the case involves an issue of foreign law. Often courts have allowed
such testimony to be heard by the jury as a basis for a decision of fact as to the law
of a foreign country. See Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Ziegler, 151 F.2d 784,
793 (3d Cir. 1945); Albert v. Brownell, 219 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1955). See
generally 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2558. The federal courts began treating
foreign law as a question of law for the court after changes in the rules of pro-
cedure for the federal courts. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1; FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1. See,
e.g., United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658, 669-70 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 918 (1979); Alosio v. Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A., 426 F. Supp. 687, 689
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1977).
14. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
15. 607 F.2dat 94.
1981]
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the use of expert testimony. The criterion to be used in determining
whether expert testimony is appropriate is whether the information "will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.' 6 This criterion gives a trial judge considerable discretion in regu-
lating the use of experts as well as in limiting the subject matter of their
testimony. In addition, the United States Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals have stated they are reluctant to reverse a trial court's decision to
allow or to prohibit expert testimony.17 The usual standard for determin-
ing whether the trial court has abused its discretion vi-d-vis expert testi-
mony is whether the action was "manifestly erroneous."'" The broad stan-
dard established by Federal Rules of Evidence 702 for the use of expert
testimony and the standard of review taken together tend to allow trial
courts great discretion in the use of expert testimony.
• Three general criteria which have been used in deciding whether or
not a trial court should allow expert testimony are: (1) whether the subject
matter is one for which expert testimony is appropriate; (2) whether the
probative value of the testimony is greater than its prejudicial effects; (3)
whether the witness is qualified to testify on the subject matter.' 9 In
Garber there was no challenge to the witness' qualifications, so the third
criterion does not come into play. The first and the second criteria, on the
other hand, are germane to an analysis of Garber. Discussion of those
aspects of Garber which relate to the first criterion will also relate to the
question of whether the evidence was relevant. The second criterion is the
same as Federal Rules of Evidence 403, and discussion of those aspects of
the case is with reference to that rule. 20
"Willfulness" is given a variety of meanings in criminal statutes. 21 As
16. FED. R. EvID. 702.
17. E.g., Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962); Nielson
v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 570 F.2d 272, 276-77 (8th Cir. 1978); Soo Line R.R. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1374 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Amaral,
488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048,
1053-54 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977). Cases reversing the
trial court's decision include: United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th
Cir. 1977); Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir.
1975). See generally Gibbons, Rules 701-706: Opinions and Expert Testimony,
57 CHI. B. REc. 224, 225-27 (1976).
18. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962) (not error to ex-
clude naval architect's testimony in relation to safety); Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1374 (8th Cir. 1977) (not error to admit testimony by ex-
pert on railroad car design).
19. United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973).
20. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, of misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
21. The construction given is often influenced by the context in which the
258 [Vol. 46
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used in the criminal tax evasion statutes, willfulness requires that a defen-
dant intend to evade or defeat his income tax,2 2 and does not include acts
which are done negligently or done because of a misunderstanding of the
law. 23 In other words, willfulness "is characterized by a specific intent to
conceal, in contrast to a genuine misunderstanding of the law's require-
ments or a good faith belief that certain income is not taxable." 24 Because
of this definition of willfulness, a good faith mistaken belief by the tax-
payer as to his obligation to pay will provide a defense. 23 It follows that if
the taxability of an item is not a settled matter, there is an increased likeli-
hood that a taxpayer would be ignorant of or mistaken about his obliga-
tion to pay tax on the item. This reasoning provides the basis for the appel-
late court's decision in Garber that the subject matter was one for which
expert testimony was appropriate.
The court of appeals in Garber stated that the refusal to allow the jury
to hear the defendant's expert deprived the defendant of evidence "show-
ing her state of mind to be reasonable." 26 This statement could be inter-
preted to be adding a requirement of reasonableness to the lack of willful-
ness defense raised by the defendant. Previous decisions, however, have
not required that a defendant's belief that items were nontaxable be
reasonable in order to constitute a defense.2 7 In Gaunt v. United States,28
for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ap-
proved an instruction of willfulness vis-d-vis tax evasion which stated that
word "willfulness" is used. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943). A few
of the meanings given "willfulness" are: acting with a bad purpose, United States
v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1933) (tax evasion); acting with reckless dis-
regard for whether an act is unlawful, United States v. Budzanoski, 462 F.2d 443,
452 (3d Cir.) (falsifying financial records of union), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949
(1972); and acting with intent to engage in the conduct, Powell v. United States,
112 F.2d 764, 767 (4th Cir. 1940) (failure by railroad to observe tariffs).
22. Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 1955); Battjes v.
United States, 172 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1949); United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d
1205, 1210 (8th Cir. 1975); Sansone v. United States, 334 F.2d 287, 292 (8th Cir.
1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 343 (1965).
23. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933); United States v.
Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 354-55 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d
240, 242 (3d Cir. 1966); Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404, 409 (5th Cir.
1963).
24. United States v, Peterson, 338 F.2d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 911 (1965).
25. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933); Battjes v. United
States, 172 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1949); United States v. Peterson, 338 F.2d 595, 598
(7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 911 (1965).
26. 607 F.2d at 99.
27. E.g., United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1966) (evi-
dence supported willfulness-reversed because instruction allowed conviction for
carelessness); Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 1963) (reversed
because instruction allowed conviction for negligence).
28. 184 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1950).
19811 259
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"[i]t is not enough if all that is shown is that the defendant was stubborn or
stupid, careless, negligent, or grossly negligent." 29
Certainly when a tax authority agrees with the taxpayer's assessment of
the taxability of an item, the taxpayer's conclusion is inferentially more
reasonable than it would be if no recognized authority for the taxpayer's
position existed. s0 Accordingly, if there is a requirement of reasonable-
ness, the testimony of an expert who agrees with the defendant's position
goes a long way toward proving the reasonableness of the position. But if
there is not a requirement that the defendant's mistake or misconception
of taxability be reasonable to negate willfulness, 3' the probative value of
expert testimony on taxability is decreased. Any good faith belief should
negate the element of willfulness, because the benchmark is a subjective
one. 32 Even so, the expert testimony would have some relevance because if
it is established that an expert could believe items nontaxable, it is some-
what more likely that an average person could make the same mistake.
While it would not be necessary that the defendant's state of mind be
reasonable to maintain the mistake defense, evidence which establishes
that a mistaken belief is reasonable would be relevant to the probability of
an individual holding that belief.
Additional support for admission of the expert's testimony is found in
the fact that courts have stated that a greater leeway should be allowed in
the introduction of evidence as to the element of willfulness.3 3 The reason
29. Id. at 291 n.4.
30. One dissenting judge in Garber believed that the similarity between a
taxpayer's conclusion and that of an expert does not establish the reasonableness
of the taxpayer's conclusion. It is certainly conceivable that the rationale underly-
ing the taxpayer's conclusion may be totally illogical and unreasonable, even
though the conclusion is the same as an expert's. 607 F.2d at 113-14 (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting).
31. In addressing the question of whether a mistake of law must be reason-
able to constitute a defense, the drafters of the Model Penal Code stated:
[A requirement of reasonableness is]... unexceptionable in the case
of an offense which can be committed negligently. What justification
can there be, however, for requiring that ignorance or mistake be
reasonable if the crime or element of the crime involved requires acting
purposely or knowingly for its commission? [Requirements of reason-
ableness] . ..are not and they cannot be applied with generality to
crimes in which the ignorance or mistake is relevant to the existence of an
essential element of purpose or knowledge.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04, Comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
32. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra. See also United States v. Ruf-
fin, 575 F.2d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 1978) (gross negligence will not support a convic-
tion for income tax evasion under I.R.C. § 7201).
33. E.g., United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134, 1137 (10th Cir. 1969)'
(transcript of defendant's conversation with third party admitted over hearsay
objection to illustrate state of mind); Petersen v. United States, 268 F.2d 87, 89
[Vol. 46
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given for this position is that an element as subjective as willfulness is ex-
tremely difficult to prove.3 4 Also, allowing the defendant additional
latitude in the introduction of evidence on his willfulness corresponds to
protection of the rights of criminal defendants, because it provides the
defendant a better opportunity to illustrate his good faith mistake as to
taxability.
In Garber the state of the law was arguably an appropriate topic for ex-
pert testimony. The evidence given was on subject matter to which the
average person could not competently testify, and, in the circumstances of
the case, the testimony was relevant to the issue of willfulness.3 5 The fact
that the expert's opinion would be relevant is not, however, necessarily suf-
ficient to warrant admission of the testimony. The Garber court did not
discuss the application of Federal Rules of Evidence 403 to the expert's
testimony.3 6 One problem is that it requires several logical steps to connect
testimony that the payments were nontaxable to the issue of willfulness.37
It is questionable whether the average juror would take the appropriate
steps. In addition, the extra time which may be taken at trial to qualify the
expert, elicit his testimony, rebut the expert's testimony, impeach the ex-
pert, and then rehabilitate him probably outweighs the probative value of
the evidence. Finally, allowing a witness to testify that payments were not
taxable would be directly contrary to the judge's instruction to the jury and
could encourage the jury to disregard the instruction and acquit the defen-
dant on an improper basis.3 8 It would be possible to give a limiting instruc-
(10th Cir. 1959) (use of several character witnesses to bolster lack of willfulness
defense); Miller v. United States, 120 F.2d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1941) (admitted
evidence of conversation with third parties to bolster lack of intent to defraud in
mail fraud case). One dissenting opinion in Garber distinguished the above cases
because the evidence in each involved direct reflections of the defendant's state of
mind. 607 F.2d at 106 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
34. Black v. United States, 309 F.2d 331, 337 (8th Cir. 1962); Hoyer v.
United States, 223 F.2d 134, 139 (8th Cir. 1955); United States v. Mathews, 335
F. Supp. 157, 161-62 (W.D. Pa. 1971), appeal dismissed, 462 F.2d 182 (3d Cir.
1972).
35. The evidence meets the standard established by the Federal Rules of
Evidence for relevancy. It makes the existence of willfulness "less probable than it
would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
36. See note 21 supra.
37. Two possible connecting routes between the testimony and the defen-
dant's willfulness would be as follows: (1) an expert believed the items non-
taxable, therefore it is reasonable to think they were nontaxable and it is more
likely the defendant thought they were nontaxable; and (2) an expert believed the
items nontaxable, therefore the taxability of the items was not clearly established
by the law and it is more likely the defendant believed the items nontaxable. It is
not clear from reading the Garber opinion which, if either, of these logical con-
nections the court makes between the testimony and the defendant's willfulness.
38. 607 F.2d at 114-15 (TjoflatJ., dissenting).
1981]
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tion, but it would likely be ineffective. Under Federal Rules of Evidence
403, the evidence arguably should have been excluded.
There is an alternative approach the Garber court could have fol-
lowed. The Garber court relied on United States v. Critzer31 and James v.
United States40 to support its conclusion that the defendant's expert should
have been heard. Critzer involved a prosecution for failure to report in-
come from a business located on an Indian reservation. The tax question
was exceptionally complex, involving interpretation of a statute relating to
reservation property. The Bureau of Indian Affairs had advised the defen-
dant that the income was tax exempt. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that the "defendant's actual intent ... [was] ir-
relevant" because as a matter of law the "requisite intent to evade and
defeat income taxes . . . [was] missing." 4' James involved tax evasion in
relation to embezzled funds. Fifteen years earlier the Supreme Court had
held embezzled funds to be nontaxable. 42 At the time James filed the
returns in question the earlier case had not been overruled, although a
subsequent decision had undermined the viability of the case. 43 Although
James established that embezzled funds were taxable, the defendant's con-
viction was reversed by the Court because the state of the law at the time
the returns were filed would not have indicated the funds were taxable. 44
Thus, both Critzer and James parallel the line of cases which holds that
defendants may not be convicted when the law in the area does not give
adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed or required. 45 Those cases
turn on the notion that due process requires sufficient specificity of the law
to provide the average person with guidelines for conduct, whether or not
the individual is in fact aware of the law. 46 Although neither Critzer nor
James was explicitly based on a due process analysis, the opinions im-
39. 498 F.2d 1160 (4th Cir. 1974).
40. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
41. 498 F.2d at 1162.
42. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 409 (1946) (overruled in James
v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961)).
43. In Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952), the Court held extorted
funds to be taxable, but distinguished the case from Wilcox. In the period be-
tween Rutkin andJames, there were some commentators who considered Wilcox
effectively overruled. See, e.g., Note, Taxation of Misappropriated Property:
The Decline and Incomplete Fall of Wilcox, 62 YALE L.J. 662, 665-66 (1953).
44. 366 U.S. at 221-22.
45. E.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972);
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1964); Wright v. Georgia, 373'
U.S. 284, 293 (1963); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
See generally Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
46. See Note, supra note 45. An adequate notice challenge typically will be
aimed at a statute which is so vague as to deny due process; if the challenge is suc-
cessful, the statute will be declared void. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jack-
[Vol. 46262
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plicitly adopted the reasoning behind the inadequate notice cases. One
cannot "willfully" violate a law unless there is adequate notice of the pro-
scribed conduct, either through specificity of the law or the reprehensible
nature of the conduct. Whether based on due process or lack of willfulness
as a matter of law, holdings such as Critzer and James do not provide
authority for introducing evidence of the law's unsettled or vague state to
the jury for determination of the willfulness issue. 47 They do, however,
provide an alternative basis on which Garber could have been decided.
The court in Garber emphasized the state of the law and set out the basis
for reversing and dismissing the case on the same grounds as Critzer and
James, but it chose instead to remand the case for a new trial in which the
state of the law will be evidence relevant to the defendant's willfulness. 48
Even though the court stated that a criminal prosecution "is an inappro-
priate vehicle for pioneering interpretations of tax law ''49 its decision to
sonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (vagrancy statute); Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (state wage and hour statute).
In other instances courts have been called upon to determine whether a judi-
cial interpretation of a statute was such that a defendant had adequate notice.
E.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1964) (interpretation of
trespass statute); United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir.) (interpreta-
tion of "harboring" with respect to illegal aliens), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995
(1975); United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1974) (inter-
pretation of obscenity). In Boule, the Court reversed a conviction for criminal
trespass which relied on an interpretation which could not have been reasonably
foreseen at the time the alleged trespass occurred. Though the defendants in
Bouie were denied due process by being prosecuted under the judicial interpreta-
tion which occurred after their arrest, there was nothing about the interpretation
which would prevent its application to subsequent defendants. In this respect the
case is consistent with Critzer and James.
The Bouie Court noted that the acts of the defendants were not improper or
immoral (malum in se), only illegal (malum prohibitum). 378 U.S. at 362. Courts
have considered the malum prohibitum/malum in se distinction determinative in
handling challenges based on lack of notice in criminal law. Compare Douglas v.
Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973) (per curiam) (unforeseeable interpretation of
traffic violation as an "arrest") with United States ex rel. Almeida v. Rundle, 383
F.2d 421, 425-26 (3d Cir.) (denying habeas corpus to defendant convicted under
interpretation of felony murder made for first time in case before the court), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 863 (1968). See generally Fruend, The Supreme Court and Civil
Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 540 (1951).
47. Both dissenting opinions point this out. 607 F.2d at 105 n.6 (Ainsworth,
J., dissenting); id. at 112 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
48. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tjoflat pointed out that the court had
laid the groundwork for a reversal due to the district court's failure to dismiss
under FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) for insufficiency of the indictment. 607 F.2d at
111 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).




Kucera-Bozarth: Kucera-Brozarth: State of the Law as Evidence for the Jury
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
MISSOURILA WRE VIEW
remand made such an interpretation by the trial court necessary.
The decision in Garber seems unwarranted on two grounds. First, the
usual means for handling criminal cases where the law is vague or unsettl-
ed is to decide as a matter of law whether the state of the law is clear
enough to support a criminal indictment. 50 Although the court empha-
sized this factor and relied on Critzer and James, it based its decision on
other grounds, i.e., that the trial court erred in refusing to hear the defen-
dant's expert witness. Second, having decided not to dismiss the case under
a Critzer analysis, the court ruled evidence admissible which was of mini-
mal probative value and presented problems of undue delay and potential
confusion of the jury.
Garber may have a significant effect depending on the limits courts
place on it. The opinion could be used to justify use of expert testimony or
other evidence on the state of the law any time a mistake of law would
negate the mental state necessary for conviction of an offense. If Garber is
limited to its facts, expert testimony on the law will be allowed only in pro-
secutions under the criminal tax evasion statutes when the taxability of the
item is a novel question. In any situation Federal Rules of Evidence 403
would frequently indicate the evidence should be excluded.
KEITH S. KuCERA-BOZARTH
50. See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
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